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SLIGHTLY MOVEABLE OBJECT:

CASE STUDY IN JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE

PROCESS-

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

THE OMNIBUS HEARING
BY RAYMOND T. NIMMER*

The thesis of this article is that attempts to reform the
criminal justice system are likely to fail unless the reform
design recognizes and accounts for the tendency of pre-existing
administrative processes to dilute the reform or ignore it altogether. Illustrating his thesis with a discussion of the failure
of the omnibus hearing concept in the San Diego Federal District Court, Mr. Nimmer provides a detailed case study of a
reform which was imposed from within the system and which
failed despite the participant-perspective of the reformer, a
judge who might have been expected to foresee such difficulties in reforming a system of which he was a part. While
the explication of the failure of the omnibus hearing in San
Diego represents in itself a significant step in the development
of a concept of administrative nullification of reforms in general, it is likely that the thesis has greater implication for
reforms which are externally imposed, such as those required
by Supreme Court decisions. As such, the article provides the
legal profession with an insightful -model for self-examination.
CONTENTS

IN TRODU CTION
I.

18 0
-------------------------------------

--------------------------

THE DISCRETIONARY ADJUSTMENT PROCESS:
OBSTACLE TO REFORM -------

A.
*

Traditional Approaches:
Elim inating Discretion

....................--------------------------------------

................................................

181
182

Research Attorney, American Bar Foundation; B.A. 1965, J.D. 1968,
Valparaiso University.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

B.
II.

VOL. 48

An Alternative Proposal:
Con trolling Discretion -----------------------------------183

THE OMNIBUS HEARING:
R EFORM

A

CASE STUDY IN JUDICIAL

-----------------------------------------------------------------.....
. ...
..
..
..
185

A.
B.

Identifying the Approach: Traditional ......................... 186
Testing the Im pact ................................................ . 188
1. Impact of Disclosure of Prosecution Files on
Case Dispositions ---------------------------........................
189
2. Efficiency-Related Im pact .....................................- 193
a. Failure to Increase Efficiency .......................... 193
b. Early Pleas Under Omnibus:
No Increase .................................................... 196
c. Scheduling Firm Appearances:
Continued Strategy Appearances ............... 198
d. Failure to Enforce New Procedure.................. 199
e. Identification of Issues:
Failure to Reach the Substance ...................... 200
f. Summary of the 1966-67 Comparison:
No Increase in Efficiency .... ............ . ....... 201
3. Omnibus 1970: Complete System
A b so rp tion ..................
..........
.........................
. 203
C ON CLUSIO N -------------------------------------------------.....................
............... 208
INTRODUCTION

T

HIS article discusses some of the underlying problems involved in achieving reform of the criminal justice process
at the judicial level. Although the focus is upon the results of
a recently completed American Bar Foundation study of a
single reform proposal-the omnibus hearing' - the purpose
is not to report on the results of that reform attempt. Rather,
this presentation develops a theme related to reform of the
criminal justice judicial machinery which was strongly suggested by the study of the omnibus hearing.
There is obviously a chronic shortage of manpower and
other resources in most criminal justice systems. Largely in
response to this shortage, but also because of a variety of other
factors, the criminal justice system today thrives not upon the
adjudicated determinations of guilt or innocence embodied in
the adversary model of criminal justice, but upon discretionary,
often informal, adjustments of prosecutions. Criminal prosecu1 R. NiMMER, OMNIBUS HEARING-AN EXPERIMENT IN RELIEVING JUDICIAL
DELAY, INEFFICIENCY AND UNFAIRNESS (1971).
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tions are initiated or deferred based upon discretionary decisions of the prosecutors and the police. Cases are terminated
via plea bargains,2 screening decisions (outright dismissal of
cases deemed to lack sufficient importance),2 and decisions to
divert the case into alternative procedures (dismissal conditioned upon the channeling of the defendant through alterna4
tive systems providing sanctions, treatment, or reparation).
Trials and legal issue hearings are often not, in the daily administrative practice, a frequently-used method of disposition.
The theme suggested by the ABF study is that reforms of
the criminal justice system produce actual change only as they
are filtered through the discretionary adjustment procedure
by which the criminal justice system functions. Changes inconsistent with the local discretionary system face difficult, if not
impossible, obstacles before they become the rule of practice
rather than the hypothetical model. Changes which are
irrelevant to current practice may simply be ignored, while
changes which are supportive of, or only slightly different from
current procedures may have comparatively easy paths toward
accomplishing their purpose. The interrelationship of this discretionary adjustment process and attempts at reform will be
illustrated by an analysis of the reaction of the San Diego court
system to the introduction of the omnibus hearing concept. It
is hoped that discussion of the impact of the discretionary adjustment process will stimulate an awareness of and sensitivity
to the problems confronting any attempt to change the criminal
justice process.
I.

THE DISCRETIONARY

ADJUSTMENT

PROCESS:

OBSTACLE TO REFORM

Since, under the proposed theme, the characteristics of the
adjustment process are the crucial variables, it follows that, in
addressing the issue of court reform, the first place to turn is
not towards the mechanics of the court process itself, although
2

See D.

NEWMAN, CONVICTION:

CENCE WITHOUT TRIAL

THE DETERMINATION

OF GUILT OR INNO-

(1966).

3See McIntyre & Lippman, Prosecutors and Early Disposition of Felony
4

Cases, 56 A.B.A.J. 1154 (1970).
The American Bar Foundation is currently engaged in a national study,
sponsored by the Justice Department's LEAA, aimed at cataloging and
analyzing various methcds of diversion from the criminal justice system.
Virtually every jurisdiction encountered during this unsystematic
national inquiry has been found to have one or more essentially informal
programs to divert crimes such as bad checks, youthful offenders, first
offenders, minor narcotics, and nonsupport from the formal flow of the
system. For a general description of a variety of efforts which we label

diversion, see F.

MILLER, PROSECUTION:
PECT WITH A CRIME chs. 8-18 (1970).

THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUS-
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these must be understood, but to the mechanics and the rationale of the discretionary adjustment procedure which surrounds
and includes the court.
A. Traditional Approaches: Eliminating Discretion
One approach to reform of the criminal justice system
would be to characterize this adjustment process as improper,
and to strive towards maximizing the use of formal adjudication mechanisms. Since a principal bar to the achievement
of this goal is the current imbalance of resources and case load,
this approach must begin by a massive effort to replenish the
resources of the system, or an equally difficult effort to restrict
the input of caie6 ilito the process.5
Although resource or input manipulation is a currently
popular theme, most proposals fail to even approach the level
of redistribution necessary to permit broad use of the adversary
model of disposition. Efforts to completely remove certain
crime categories from the system seldom achieve the necessary
balance for a variety of reasons: they tend to be blocked by
political considerations and a tendency to adhere to traditional
definitions of crimes; they often deal with crimes which, despite
often impressive total arrest numbers, consume comparatively
little time in the system; and they often propose the creation
of massive and expensive non-criminal procedures to handle
the newly redefined non-crime.6 On the other hand, for any
resource-oriented effort to approach success, it must not only
add sufficient judicial and prosecutorial manpower to enable
trial of the current cases being put into the system and the
cases which are pending, but must also account for the everexpanding workload of the criminal system. It must deal with
the-probability that, as additional resources permit, the extent
of defense representation of the routine bulk of the caseload, a
representation which had been compressed by the caseload
pressure, will expand with a resultant consumption of larger
quantities of judge and other system resources. It must not
only create a sufficient supply of defense attorneys to enable
them to carry much smaller caseloads, but must also take steps
to either provide large public defense offices, or to make the
smaller caseloads financially feasible for the private practitioner. Finally, a resource-oriented effort must contend with
the fact that, as the size and investigative capacity of the police
5

For an example of this approach, see F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1964); N. MoRImS & F. HAWKINS, AN HONEST POLrn-

CIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIMINAL LAW (1970).
6 See, e.g., R. NIMMER. Two MILLION UNNECESSARY ARRESTS (1971).
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department increase, the rate of input of criminal cases will
increase, regardless of any real increase in the number of crimes
committed.
Even if some semblance of a balance is attained, it is unlikely that the discretionary adjustment of cases would cease.
Although the current imbalance of resources makes it difficult
to separate actual reasons from created justifications, the
rhetoric from the agencies in the system explains much of the
adjustment process in terms of adjusting the law to fit the
facts of the cases, modifying harsh laws or ignoring antiquated
statutes. To the extent that these and similar non-resource
rationales actually explain the process, the discretionary adjustment of cases would continue even if a resource balance was
achieved. Recognizing the impossibility of shaping laws which
can routinely be applied to a limitless variety of factual circumstances to achieve just results, the elimination of discretionary justice seems neither possible nor desirable.'
An Alternative Proposal: Controlling Discretion
An alternative and more realistic approach to reform regards the adjustment process as a fixed characteristic of the
system, and directs attention to modifying, reshaping, safeguarding, or otherwise shaping it to fit desired reform objectives." Thus, procedural change to enhance judicial efficiency
or to increase fairness would work upon a system in which the
norm is and continues to be discretionary, not adjudicated,
disposition. Increases of resources or limitations on case input
would be intended not to eliminate the adjustment process, but
to ameliorate severe imbalances which tend to shape the system
into an undesirable mold, or to provide a tool for the achievement of other reform objectives, such as increasing the availability and the use of trial mechanisms within a system in
which the norm remains non-adjudicated disposition. Realistically construed, most, if not all, reform proposals fit into this
alternative mold. As such, they must work upon a system of
exercised discretion and, in so doing, encounter a number of
substantial and predictable difficulties, several of which are
outlined below.
B.

7

See generally Remington & Rosenblum, The Criminal Law and the
Legislative Process, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 481.
8 Although he focuses primarily upon administrative processes other than
the criminal justice system, recent efforts by Professor K. C. Davis reflect the understanding that since discretion is the lifeblood of administration, the way to reform administrative practice must be through
modifying ("safeguarding") the exercise of that discretion. K. DAVIS,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1970).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 48

Formal adjudication of issues occurs in court under the
supervision of the judge and is readily susceptible to his control. On the other hand, the important decisions made within
the discretionary adjustment process, decisions which are reflected in the flow of the cases through the court system, occur
out of sight of the judge. Plea discussions control the method
of disposition and the type of sentence imposed, and have a substantial impact upon the time lapse from filing to disposition
and the number of court appearances per case. These are commonly conducted without overt participation of the judge whose
primary function often is to ratify, reject, or modify, post facto,
decisions which have already been made. In a few jurisdictions
the judge actively participates in screening decisions and dominates the charging practice, but these are the exceptions rather
than the rule and are largely explained by local tradition. 9
Theoretically, the judge's power to affect these decisions is
great, but practically, it is limited. Obviously, the court has no
opportunity to review or revise discretionary decisions to forego
prosecution entirely. However, even after a case is filed-a
situation in which theory would require that disposition decisions be made by the court -the ability to revise, reject or run
counter to the discretionary power exercised elsewhere is limited. For example, in a jurisdiction in which continuances are
routinely granted in order to permit full negotiation of cases, a
judge could seek to limit continuances by encouraging counsel
to agree sooner. However, if the judge fails to change the timing
of the negotiating process, he would be hard-pressed to deny a
continuance where the denial would cut off bargaining which
might benefit all sides and force an unprepared defense and
prosecution into premature trial or hearing. Similarly, although
the court is theoretically in full control of sentence decisions,
a judge faced with the real prospect that taking control might
disrupt the bargaining system and result in unmanageable numbers of trials, would not often revise agreed-upon sentences.
This is not to imply that the court is impotent; certainly it is
a principal determinant of the policies which are created. However, once created and functioning, the court may be unable
to unilaterally alter the existing practice.
Although an important theme of the discretionary process
is individualization of justice, recurrent fact situations, repetition of encounters with defense counsel, prosecutor, police offi9 See McIntyre, A Study of Judicial Dominance of the Charging Process,

59 J. CREM. L.C. & P.S. 463 (1968).
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cer, and judge, and the consistently heavy press of the caseload
force the discretionary process into a repetitive mold. Roles
develop; practices and priorities become firmly established. In
short, the system settles into an accommodation of the various
interests involved, and this accommodation becomes, over a
long period, a comfortable pattern often regarded by the participants as a correct balancing of the various interests involved. The court reform must alter this balance if it is to
achieve any change in the manner in which cases are handled.
Predictably, the task of dislodging any aspect of the balance
is not easy, and this explains, in large part, why many formal
reforms simply fail to produce any real change in practice.
As a consequence of the accommodation of system interests,
the theoretical models of criminal justice roles no longer apply,
and any reform must confront the real, not the theoretical
model. The judge is not simply the impartial arbiter interested
in "just" dispositions; he is also concerned that a flow of cases
be maintained. The prosecutor does not inevitably aim toward
full prosecution, but tempers the law with his own notions of
justice and expediency. The interaction between prosecution
and defense is often more characteristically cooperative - a
mode of survival- than adversary. 10
Even if a change is enacted and implemented, its results
will not correspond to the consequences which might be anticipated if the system were less fluid and reacted directly to
change. Discretion is controlled by a variety of factors, only
one of which is the formal law. A change in the law may leave
most of the other factors unaffected, and if, as is often true, the
formal rules are only a secondary factor shaping practice, the
discretionary process may go unchanged. On the other hand, a
formal change may alter one element of the balance of the various interests involved and the balancing process will shift to
counteract the change. In any event, if unchanged, the other
factors to which the process responds will ultimately shape the
new factor into a mold consistent with the old established
practice.
II.

THE OMNIBUS HEARING:

A

CASE STUDY

IN JUDICIAL REFORM

The following discussion seeks to place the relatively abstract comments made above into the illustrative context of a
single court reform. As indicated earlier, the object of the dis10 See Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT
RES. 52 (1967).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 48

cussion is not to attempt a thorough exposition of the results or
method of the ABF study of the omnibus hearing, nor to evaluate the desirability of that reform in general. Rather, it is
intended as an illustration, by concrete example, of the concept
that reforms of the criminal justice system at the judicial level
are interpreted into actual change by filtering through the discretionary adjustment procedure which we label the criminal
justice process.
A.

Identifying the Approach: Traditional

The omnibus hearing was promulgated in 1967 by the
American Bar Association Minimum Standards Report Relating
to Discovery and Proceedings Prior to Trial" as the focal point
of a three-step pre-trial process, the purpose of which is to
move the case speedily and efficiently toward disposition. The
hearing, in theory, provides the context in which the court is
to assert affirmative control over the identification and early
disposition of issues and the scheduling of future appearances
in court. This, in addition to a major increase in the extent of
discovery allowed to the defense, is the most important innovation of the omnibus proposal. The responsibility for raising
issues and moving a case along, previously the sole province
of counsel, is shared with the court. With respect to moving
12
a case toward disposition, the court's role is predominant.
Despite the shift of responsibility from counsel to the court,
the first step in the proposed process involves discussions between counsel without court supervision. During this period
there is an informal exchange of information (amounting to
broad discovery for the defense), plea discussions and a discussion of the probable progression of the case, including an
identification of the issues which are likely to be raised. As the
Report acknowledges, informal discussions as contemplated
under this procedure with respect to possible guilty pleas are
not unique, but already occur in most jurisdictions. However,
the process contemplated by the Report is allegedly unique in
the extent to which information is made available to the defense
and in the fact that an informal discussion period is encouraged
-if not required- by the structure of the process and by the
court.1 3 The intended products of this period are full knowl11

A.B.A.

12

The conglomerate nature of the omnibus hearing proposal has led to its

PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL (1969).

implementation with a variety of emphases and results. See R. NnIMER,

supra note 1.

13 In state court systems disclosure of prosecution evidence often occurs

during the preliminary hearing. See McIntyre, supra note 9.
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edge of the facts of the case, the identification of primary issues,
and a determination that the possibility of a guilty plea has
been explored prior to any extensive involvement of the court.
The second stage, close court supervision of the progress of
the case, is initiated by the omnibus hearing, the date for which
is set according to local formula at the time of arraignment.
The term "omnibus" is an apt description since the purposes to
which the hearing is put are numerous and interrelated. First,
the hearing provides a regular, efficient forum to enforce the
wide discovery and early discussion aspects of the first stage.
Immediate rulings on discovery issues are obtained and the
court can apply explicit pressure-often by simply refusing
to proceed - upon counsel to meet and discuss the case. Second,
the hearing provides the court an opportunity to ensure that
all issues have been identified and raised. Counsel are required
to file a "checklist motion" indicating all action to be taken
in the case, and the judge explores the case in open court, via
the checklist, ensuring that all possible issues are noted. Motions and defenses which should have been raised at the hearing, but were not, are waived. Third, the hearing is a focal
point for the simplification of motion practice. Notation upon
the checklist motion form is sufficient to raise any issue, and
written briefs are avoided. Motions not requiring evidentiary
hearings are disposed of immediately at the hearing. Fourth,
the hearing provides the court the opportunity to schedule
future court appearances so as to promote speed, efficiency, and
over-all case flow. Further hearings in a given matter are set
for hearing as soon as conveniently possible, achieving a minimum lapse of time from complaint to disposition. Motions are
scheduled for a single or minimum number of court appearances, and the entire workload of the court is arranged for a
steady flow, avoiding periods of high or low activity.
The third stage is devoted to trial preparation and is labeled
a pretrial conference. The specifics of a projected trial are discussed and determined during a court appearance. Inasmuch
as most cases will not go to trial and many that do need no
additional preparation, this aspect of the process is of little
importance.
Shortly after it was promulgated, the omnibus hearing was
introduced on an experimental basis into the federal district
court having the larger criminal caseload in the system-the
Southern District of California (San Diego). This court continues to be the only criminal court in which the hearing is
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used on a regular basis. Shortly after it was introduced, there
appears to have been a good deal of enthusiasm for the success
which the hearing supposedly achieved. In fact, the A.B.A.
Report, in a draft published subsequent to the San Diego experiment, suggests the following:
Although the collection of conclusive data has not been possible, in the opinion of the judges and many of the lawyers
involved, the new procedures and the increased discovery appear
to be working well and fulfilling the objectives sought: increasing the efficiency of the judges and lawyers, speeding up the process, improving the performance cf defense counsel, eliminating a substantial amount of paperwork, making trials shorter
and more to the point, increasing the number of guilty pleas
-all
apparently without any sacrifice of the interests of the
government or the defendant.14

B.

Testing the Impact

The subsequent American Bar Foundation study focused
upon the San Diego court's use of the omnibus hearing. The
research involved observation and interview procedures with
respect to the omnibus process as it functioned in 1970, and
analysis of random samples of cases for the period before and
after the introduction of the hearing process in 1967. The
samples taken were of narcotics cases, a crime category which
accounts for over 50 percent of the district's caseload. The conclusions of this research were, simply stated, that the sole positive accomplishment of omnibus in 1967 as well as in 1970 was
to establish a broadened discovery procedure. All of the other
objectives of the process were either substantially unperformed,
or were performed poorly. In addition, the hearing proved to
be counter-productive in that it increased judge time per case
and lengthened the time required to dispose of most of the caseload. Finally, the hearing has, over the three years between
1967 and 1970 suffered an erosion of its format, and is apparently no longer expected to perform the extensive goals proposed in the A.B.A. Report.'14 A.B.A. MINEIMUM STANDARDS RELATING To DIScOVERY, supra note 11, at 9.
15 The cycle of excessive, immediate praise followed by destructive criti-

cism based upon reflection and research is common in the field of judicial administrative experiments.
Viewed as a whole, the campaign (to eliminate court delay)
has gone forward with much vigor but with no real breakthrough. There has been a definite pattern to the activity.
The sponsors of a new device trumpet it as a miracle remedy,
manage to get it introduced and almost instantly pronounce
it a lavish success. After a time, experience and careful research deflate the premature boasts and then something new
is invented.
Rosenberg, Ccurt Congestion: Status, Causes, and Proposed Remedies,
in THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 29 (H. Jones
ed. 1965).
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of Prosecution

Files

on

Case

The achievement of a broadened discovery procedure occurred in the midst of a continuing controversy concerning the
desirability of increasing disclosure of prosecution files to defense attorneys.'" Much of this controversy focuses upon the
effect that increased disclosure might have on the adversary
process represented by the traditional models of criminal justice.
Opponents of broad disclosure suggest that it will hinder the
prosecution of cases and produce a higher rate of acquittals
by encouraging fabrication of defenses and intimidation of witnesses. On the other hand, proponents emphasize the need to
achieve greater equality in the task of preparing for and actually conducting trials and other "essential" formal steps of the
process.
The evidence in San Diego suggests that the focus of this
controversy might be misplaced. Disclosure of prosecution files
appears to have occurred in San Diego with little initial strong
opposition from the U.S. Attorney's Office. Of the cases in our
1967 sample, 77 percent of the defense attorneys neither requested nor received court intervention requiring disclosure by
the prosecution. In these cases the prosecutor apparently complied "voluntarily" with the disclosure rules. In an undetermined portion of the remainder of the caseload, the court order
for further disclosure was a routine matter, requested and issued
regardless of whether or not there had been prior compliance
by the prosecutor.
Thus, although the theory would indicate that the prosecutor would oppose the increased disclosure, the U.S. Attorney's
Office complied substantially voluntarily. In large part, this
occurred as a result of a trade-off in which the U.S. Attorney
relinquished the supposed advantages of secrecy in return for
potential benefits to be received in other areas. Although the
expected benefits did not materialize, the increased disclosure
was not discontinued because the practice apparently had little
or no impact upon the disposition of the bulk of the caseload.
It would be an overstatement to indicate that the achievement of the broader disclosure resulted solely from the trade-off
indicated above. Certainly, an important factor in the success
of this objective was that, from the outset, the judges in the
16 See, e.g., Moore, Criminal Discovery, 19

HASTINGS

L.J. 865 (1968); Mar-

golin, Toward Effective Criminal Discovery in California, 56 CALIF. L.
REv. 1040 (1968); Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 228 (1964).
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district placed a strong emphasis upon the disclosure element of
the omnibus format. It occupied a central position in the literature distributed by the court when omnibus was first implemented. Disclosure issues were the most frequently discussed
matters at the omnibus hearings during its first year of implementation. 7 Likewise, the commonly-used, individualized
explanations for the performance of reform efforts -- personalities of judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys -played
an
important role. In 1967, San Diego could be described as enjoying a strong and interested judiciary, a cooperative prosecutor and willing defense attorneys.
The nature of the trade-off involved becomes apparent
when we examine the manner in which the discovery concept
was promoted and the substance of the prosecutor's cooperation. The literature distributed by the court sets the theme.'
Broad disclosure was promoted only partially as an objective
in its own right, and primarily as a tool to achieve other goals,
many of which might appear highly desirable to the U.S. Attorney, e.g., certainty of conviction, more frequent guilty pleas,
earlier guilty pleas, firmer schedules for court appearances, and
early and firm listings of defense issues to be raised. Even more
revealing than the judicial emphasis is an article authored by
the head U.S. Attorney at the time,1" which raises many specific
objections to the impact of the increased disclosure upon the
prosecution of the caseload. However, the entire article is
prefaced by the author's admission that the circumstances in
the district at the time that omnibus was proposed made the
innovation essential. The exact circumstances referred to and
the benefits expected irom omnibus were indicated by an assistant U.S. Attorney who commented that "the purpose of the
increased discovery was to increase guilty pleas and to facilitate firm scheduling of appearances in court." Faced with a
huge caseload and a small staff, the U.S. Attorney, prior to
omnibus, apparently wasted large portions of staff time preparing for scheduled appearances which were never held. The prosOf the cases in our 1967 sample, in cnly 36 percent were any issues decided at the omnibus hearing itself. The issues most frequently decided
at the hearing concerned disclosure of prosecution files, occurring in
23 percent of the sample.
18 Form OH distributed by the court during 1967 lists a number of purposes of the omnibus hearing: eliminate written motion practice, provide
a checklist to suggest issues and procedures to counsel, secure discovery
for defense and prosecution, expose and dispose cf latent constitutional
issues, provide a specific time for issue exploration and plea discussion,
and postpone until later the decision of issues requiring further hearing.
19 Miller, The Omnibus Hearing-An Experiment in Federal Criminal
Discovery, 5 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 293 (1963).
17
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pect was that the omnibus hearing, aided by the broad discovery
which was a part of the concept, would help to alleviate the
lost time problem.
The trade-off was facilitated by the fact that the discovery
had no observable impact upon the rate of guilty plea disposition. Judge Carter, a member of the District Court during
the time when omnibus hearing was first introduced, later observed that the experience with the hearing indicated to him
that the increased disclosure might result in a few, but not
many, additional acquittals. This observation is supported by
the fact that, in comparing our 1966 and 1967 samples, virtually
20
identical rates of guilty pleas and trials were indicated.
At first it may appear somewhat unexpected that one side
of the bargaining system could relinquish substantial information to the opposing side and leave the dispositional pattern substantially unchanged. The explanation, however, lies in the role
played by the new disclosure in the context of bargained justice
as it existed in San Diego at the time the omnibus procedure
was introduced.
For many defense attorneys, the impact of the disclosure
to the defense was not to weaken the prosecution's case, but
was largely an internal matter for the defense. One attorney
remarked that he could not rely upon the prosecution's evidence contained in its files in preparing his case for trial. Even
if the files were complete, they were prepared from a wholly
dissimilar viewpoint and would not sufficiently explore issues
beneficial to the defense. However, the attorney did indicate
that the disclosure was a tool with which he could examine
the accuracy of his client's description of the crime, and which
might be used to persuade otherwise reluctant clients to accept
favorable deals. Other defense attorneys took a less pessimistic
view of the value of the prosecution files in their case preparation, but most emphasized the intra-defense impact of the disclosures. Rather than strengthening their case against the
prosecution, the major impact was to test their client's
credibility.
Several U.S. Attorneys noted this internal use of the disclosed evidence, but emphasized a second explanation for the
lack of a strong observable impact on the disposition of cases.
20Trials occurred in the following percentages of cases:
1966
1967
20%
11%
hard narcotics
8%
marijuana
11%
14%
9%
minor narcotics
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It was their suggestion that the discovery produced offsetting
effects. Cases which were borderline with respect to a defense
decision to plead guilty, but in which the state's evidence was
strong, would be pushed toward a guilty plea-the disclosure
tending to demonstrate that resistance could not prevent conviction. In other cases in which the prosecution's evidence was
weak, and there existed some tendency on the part of the defense toward a trial, the case might be pushed away from the
guilty plea route. For the bulk of the cases, however, disclosure
was largely irrelevant since the factual basis for prosecution
was simple and understood by all.
The current U.S. Attorney also distinguished among cases
within his caseload, but did not perceive a sizeable negative
effect as a consequence of disclosure with respect to more than
a few of the cases handled by his office. He indicated that,
although some assistants might feel that the disclosure hindered
their preparation, they would be hard-pressed to cite a single
specific illustration. For cases in which a protracted series of
negotiations or an eventual trial would occur, both sides would
tend to be fully prepared before the termination of the case
regardless of whether disclosure occurred. For the bulk of the
caseload, however, a guilty plea would be the eventual product
regardless of the presence of broad disclosure. In these cases,
he felt, the disclosure served merely to add an element of fairness to the process.
Plea negotiation is a process of give and take with a variety
of unstated premises and tools on both sides. Consequently, an
"intrusion" into this arrangement in the form of new rules
giving one side an advantage is likely to be met with concomitant adjustments on one or more fronts.
That disclosure of prosecution files would not substantially
affect guilty plea rates should, therefore, have been anticipated to some extent. The amount and kind of information
the prosecution has against the defendant are simply two elements among many that enter into the bargaining process. The
prosecutor could maintain the existing frequency of guilty pleas
by offsetting disclosure with lighter charges or sentences, for
instance. As one assistant remarked, disclosure was a fact of
life which he had learned to live with. He might have said
"which he had adjusted to."
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Efficiency-Related Impact
a. Failure to Increase Efficiency

The benefits expected from the increased disclosure and
the omnibus hearing itself did not materialize. The rate of
guilty pleas did not increase following the omnibus hearing's
introduction. Neither was the hearing able to increase the frequency of early guilty pleas, establish a more effective scheduling process for court appearances, speed the disposition of the
caseload in general or conserve judicial time spent on the case.
Instead, it proved to be counterproductive, delaying a substantial number of the cases and resulting in additional comsumption of judge time per case.
In large measure, the omnibus hearing failed in these areas
because the preexisting process was already highly effective
in conserving judge time and achieving speedy dispositions of
cases. Prior to the omnibus hearing, the criminal justice proccess in San Diego achieved a remarkable number of early dispositions. Fifty-nine percent of the cases in our sample for the
year prior to omnibus were disposed of by the court within
90 days of the filing of the indictment. Viewed in another
manner, 48 percent were disposed of on or before the second
appearance in court following the arraignment on indictment.
This performance is indicative of the preexisting emphasis
of the discretionary system upon the conservation of judicial
time in San Diego. One portion of our analysis of the random
samples of San Diego narcotics cases involved use of a scale
designed to estimate the comparative time spent in court for
various appearances. Computing these estimates for each case
and totaling the results, we found that 65 percent of the cases
in our sample during 1966-prior to the establishment of the
omnibus hearing-were handled with in-court time of less
than or equal to the time required for the indictment-arraignment-disposition hearing.
Neither the result with respect to the speed of disposition,
nor the comments concerning in-court time, were limited to
nonserious crimes. Our sample, although restricted to narcotics cases, spread through various levels of seriousness as
measured by potential sentence. Included were hard narcotics,
importation cases, marijuana cases, and a variety of miscellaneous minor charges. Minimum potential sentences ranged
from a minimum of 20 years in the hard narcotics cases to a
minimum of less than 1 year in the minor charge category.
Throughout all of these groups, the pattern was similar: most
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cases were disposed of within extremely short time intervals
21
and with little consumption of judicial in-court time.
This speedy and efficient disposition pattern reflects discretionary adjustment to an extremely heavy caseload pressure
in the district. San Diego has been, for quite s-me time, the
federal district with the heaviest load of criminal cases per
authorized judgeship. 22 Similarly, the district has traditionally
functioned with a limited, and largely overworked, U.S. Attorney's office.
Given this imbalance between caseload and resources, the
district adopted an early and effective plea negotiation procedure and extensive screening process at the U.S. Attorney's
office. In part, the ability to terminate cases early must be
attributed to the nature of the caseload; border offenses predominiate in the district and often present few, if any, issues
to be negotiated away. However, it is clear that the U.S. Attorney engaged in extensive negotiations, and that these negotiations began early. Also, the negotiating tools used by the U.S.
Attorney were highly effective. One tool involved the statutes
charged. With respect to narcotics cases, the statutes most frequently charged in San Diego involved extremely high minimum and maximum penalties,2 3 and the purpose in charging
them was often not to achieve the conviction under the higher
statute, but simply to achieve negotiating leverage. Seventythree percent of the guilty plea cases in the 1966 sample involv21 Time lapse--percent disposed of within 90 days:
64%
hard narcotics
60%
marijuana
82%
minor narcotics
Judge time-percent disposed of before indictment-arraignment:
disposition
77%
hard narcotics
60%
marijuana
66%
minor narcotics
That serious charges were handled with minimal judge time so frequently is, no doubt, due to the practice of over-charging discussed
above. A serious charge, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964) (generally referring to penalty for illegal importation and sale of narcotic drugs), was
readily, and quickly, reduced in most cazes.
22 In recent years, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts has employed a weighted scale to estimate the workload per judge in each of
the federal district courts.
The weighted caselcad reflects the amount of court time used
for types of civil and criminal cases divided by the proportions
of total terminations. The weight of cases is based on, the 1964
revisions described on pp. 156-161 in the Annual Report of the
Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1964.
AD. OFFICE U.S. COURTS, ANN. REP. TABLE XI, n. 1 (1969).
San Diego has always ranked high. In 1969 it had a weighting of
1077 for its criminal caseload while the Northern District of Illinois
(Chicago) had a weighting cf 375 for its total caseload. Id.
23 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964) or 21 U.S.C. § 176a (1964).
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minor charge
ing these charges produced charge reductions -a
being substituted for the high penalty statutes. A second negotiating tool employed was that of offering extremely light sentences as part of the bargain. San Diego has consistently recorded low sentence severity ratings in the annual reports dis24
tributed by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
Finally, the judges in the district not only recognized the prevalence of negotiations, but actually promoted them as a necessary
response to an imbalanced caseload-resource mixture.
Negotiations were, and continue to be, begun virtually from
the point at which a complaint is filed. The factor determining
the timing of the actual plea appears simply to have been the
length of time necessary to establish a firm agreement. The
effectiveness with which the process reached this point at early
steps in the progression of its cases is attested by the frequency
of pleas within 90 days of filing.
In addition to the extensive and early plea negotiation
process, the U.S. Attorney followed a highly selective prosecution policy. Criminal complaints are presented to his office
from a variety of sources, including the FBI and immigration
authorities, and the rate of complaints which the U.S. Attorney
refuses to file varies according to which agency presents the
matter. However, a rough estimate suggests that as many as
50 percent of all complaints presented to the office are not
prosecuted. We did not examine the bases upon which this
extensive screening process was conducted in pre-omnibus years
or in 1970. The net product of the screening was, however, that
the prosecutions in San Diego were concentrated upon cases
in which the government's case was relatively strong or, at
least, upon cases involving alleged, substantial criminal violations rather than technical violations or the products of harassing enforcement techniques.
On the surface, our conclusion that the San Diego system
was extremely efficient in disposing of the bulk of its caseload
may appear to contradict the impression of the U.S. Attorney's
Office that the process was wasteful. Upon analysis, however,
the apparent contradiction is fully explicable. Although most
cases were handled efficiently, a minority of our sample did
require substantial in-court involvement, required over 1 year
for disposition, and encountered over 10 continuances per case.
Given a large caseload, this small percentage of the caseload
24 UNITED

STATES ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURTS (1968).

STATES

COURTS,
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would still involve a large number of actual cases. It is likely
that the cases fitting into this longer mold consumed the bulk
of the U.S. Attorney's time and attention, and that they provided the benchmark with which the performance of the system was measured. The easy, more numerous cases tended to
be forgotten simply because they were handled so easily,
whereas the difficult cases tended to be more prominent because of their difficulty.
b.

Early Pleas Under Omnibus: No Increase

The omnibus procedure was intended to increase the frequency of early guilty pleas and early indications that a guilty
plea would be entered. If accomplished, this would produce a
direct benefit in terms of speedier dispositions and would tend
to avoid the scheduling uncertainties involved in scheduled appearances rendered unnecessary by late-developing pleas. This
result was to be achieved by establishing the omnibus hearing
as a cutoff point before which extensive negotiation would
occur, but after which negotiation would cease or, at least, be
markedly curtailed. The attorneys could then enter the hearing
with a clear notion of how the case would be disposed, and,
acting upon this notion, the court could establish firm schedules
for the case.
Given the preexisting, extensive early negotiation practice,
the omnibus process could not produce much of an increase.
In fact, it produced the opposite result, delaying the entry of
guilty pleas in many cases. The following table illustrates the
shift which occurred, indicating the timing of the entry of a
guilty plea in terms of the number of appearances after arraignment at which it was entered. For most of the cases in 1967,
the omnibus hearing represented the first post-arraignment
appearance.
TABLE I: Step at which guilty plea entered
(cumulative percentage, all cases)
(1)

(2)

(3)

arraignment:
hard narcotics
marijuana
minor narcotics
first post-arraignment appearance:
hard narcotics
marijuana
minor narcotics
second post-arraignment appearance:
hard narcotics
marijuana
minor narcotics

1966

1967

11%
9%
39%

4%
3%
7%

37%
24%
53%

10%
9%
29%

50%
35%
66%

20%
19%
37%
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This shift is attributable to an affirmative decision by defense counsel to defer the finalization of plea negotiation until
after the omnibus hearing. Two factors contributed to this
decision. Judge Carter suggested one explanation, observing
that many attorneys delayed until the omnibus hearing to enter
a guilty plea in order to benefit from the disclosure which occurred during the interim between arraignment and omnibus.
A second explanation relates more to the psychological effect
of the implicit statement by the court inherent in its adoption
of the omnibus process that the desirable method of disposition
of cases in the district was through the omnibus hearing. In
order to ensure use of the omnibus hearing during its early
period, the judges in the district placed a strong emphasis upon
the desirability of use of the hearing by the defense attorney.
This was regarded as a statement by the court that it was not
interested in dispositions of cases prior to omnibus, but would
prefer disposition to be delayed until after omnibus.
A further indication that the hearing was not effective at
compressing the plea negotiation process was that during the
early steps of the process, the frequency of in-court indications
that a plea would be entered did not increase. There was an artificial increase caused by the delay in plea entry noted above.
However, at the appearance following, when the effect of the
shift in plea entry had faded, the rate of plea indications was
roughly identical to a comparable stage during the prior year. 25
The failure of the omnibus hearing to compress the plea
negotiation process illustrates the tenacity, if not the desirability, of the discretionary adjustment process when it is at
peak efficiency. The preexisting procedure which the parties
25 Examining the combined rate of pleas and plea indications, it is clear

that by the second post-arraignment appearance, no significant difference appears:
1966
1967
arraignment:
hard narcotics
16%
12%
marijuana
19%
10%
minor narcotics
46%
25%
first post-arraignment:
hard narcotics
47%
43%
marijuana
69%
32%
minor narcotics
68%
59%
second post-arraignment:
hard narcotics
61%
55%
marijuana
76%
41%
minor narcotics
74%
76%
Here, as in some other comparative analyses, marijuana cases diverge
from the pattern in the other two groups. The divergence apparently
relates to a border "crackdcwn" on marijuana violations occurring during 1967. The existence of this crackdown makes analysis of marijuana
comparisons impossible, and the full report focuses, in comparisons, upon
the other categories.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 48

had "adjusted to" was not affected by the addition of the omnibus hearing and, consequently, the new procedure resulted only
in an additional time-consuming step.
c.

Scheduling Firm Appearances:
Continued Strategy Appearances

Even assuming that the rate of the negotiation process
was not speeded, omnibus could have made some inroads into
the scheduling problems of the district by encouraging or forcing attorneys to be more realistic in predicting the probable
mode of disposition of the case. That is, at the omnibus hearing,
attorneys in cases in which there was a clear likelihood of an
eventual plea disposition could have been made to schedule
their cases for plea hearings rather than for "trial," thereby
minimizing the extent to which resources and preparation
would be wasted on scheduled trial dates rendered unnecessary
by a guilty plea. This did not occur. As indicated above, the
frequency of early plea indications did not increase. Viewed
another way, the act of setting a case for trial did not become a
firm indication that a trial would occur. Of all the cases in our
sample which were set for trial following the omnibus hearing,
57 percent eventually plead guilty without trial. On the other
hand, of all the cases set for disposition hearings, only one case
failed to result in a guilty plea, resulting in a trial disposition.
Many cases had continuances of scheduled disposition hearings,
apparently reflecting prolonged haggling over specifics of the
plea bargain, but only one encountered a complete breakdown
in the bargaining process. This high degree of conformance
to "disposition" schedulings suggests that the in-court statement
or request for a disposition hearing was regarded by the defense
attorneys in the district as an essentially firm commitment
that a guilty plea would be entered. It was a firm commitment
which in neither 1966 nor 1967 was entered until the actual
plea bargain was clearly in sight.
Thus, the omnibus hearing failed to produce more frequent
and earlier firm plea indications because it could not further
compress an already speedy process and because it failed to accomplish an actual change in the meaning attributed to the
"trial" and "disposition" schedulings. Although it may tend to
be characteristic of any negotiated process, the importance attached to a disposition scheduling could be altered by established practice. Such scheduling could be regarded as merely
indicating an inclination to negotiation - an indication subject
to being revoked should negotiations falter. The experience
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of omnibus might suggest, however, that when prior practice
attaches a greater significance to the "disposition" schedule, this
practice cannot be readily altered, even where the alteration
might serve a stated interest in minimizing wasted effort.
d. Failure to Enforce New Procedure
One method which might have been used to obtain more
realistic indications of intention would have been to enforce
the appearances which were scheduled- refusing requests for
continuances unless extremely good cause were shown and barring or discouraging pleas after trial or after hearing schedules
had been made. There was no necessity to enforce scheduled
disposition hearings. On the other hand, the court found itself
to be largely impotent in enforcing trial or hearing dates. The
rate at which continuances were granted for the year following
omnibus was actually greater than the continuance rate for
the prior year. Additionally, many cases which had been set
for trial reverted to plea disposition. This lack of enforcement
occurred in the context of a judicial staff highly interested in
obtaining firmer schedulings, and the reasons why actual enforcement did not occur are instructive.
There was an unstated, but obvious, element of expediency
involved in the nonenforcement of trial or hearing schedules.
The court could not have afforded, in terms of available resources, to hold a trial in anything remotely approaching the
percentage of its caseload which had been set for trial after
omnibus. Such a massive use of trial or other adjudicatory
mechanisms could not have been used for even the short period
which might have been sufficient to accomplish a change in the
meanings attached to indicated schedules. Thus, in a sense, enforcement could follow, but could not precede a change in the
significance of schedules.
The explanation suggested in our interview is that denying
requests for continuances or refusing pleas was often viewed
by the judges as an unfair procedure. The judges in the district
were fully aware of the fact that the negotiated plea is the
primary method of disposition for their caseload. Given this
awareness, the continuance request was frequently regarded as
a vehicle for permitting negotiations to run their full course.
Since the negotiation process had not been compressed as a
result of the omnibus hearing, the judges felt that enforcing
schedules in the face of a discretionary process which continued
to rely upon the judicial willingness to grant extensions would
unfairly force unprepared parties into adjudication. Also, an
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element of unfairness was involved in the possibility of denying the defendant the fruits of a favorable bargain. This potential unfairness became apparent in individual situations in
which a strict enforcement could have been followed, and the
factors apparent in the individual case overcame the generalized
judicial interest in enforcing the schedules which had been
established.
e.

Identification of Issues:
Failure to Reach the Substance

A related problem is the inability of the omnibus hearing
to perform well in identifying or discussing issues. The theory
of the omnibus hearing was that the parties and the court would
be able to raise and consider any and all possible issues which
would be decided in the case. This would not only improve the
extent to which issues were raised, but would assist in scheduling cases. However, other than issues relating to disclosure and
relating to motions to sever multiple defendants, little or no
activity concerning substantive issues occurred at the omnibus
hearing. Of the few cases in which substantive issues were
raised either on the form filed at omnibus or during the hearing
itself, approximately 50 percent did not follow the issues through
to disposition.
In part, the weak performance concerning discussion and
firm indication of issues to be raised and decided relates to the
timing of the hearing. Several attorneys remarked that 2 weeks
after arraignment was simply too early for the attorney to be
fully conversant with the issues which should be raised and
litigated.
Of greater importance, however, is what might best be
labeled the "overbreadth" of the omnibus hearing as practiced
in San Diego. Although omnibus was designed as an alternative
method to be employed at the option of the defense attorney, in
practice the court affirmatively promoted the use of omnibus
and the attorneys tended to use the hearings as a tool to delay
disposition of cases. Of the cases in the 1967 sample, less than 13
percent waived the hearing and for most of the cases waiving,
the explanation seems to be that the defendant was a fugitive
during the early pendency of the case and, when apprehended,
there appeared to be little or no reason for holding the hearing.
This almost universal use of the omnibus hearing resulted not
only in a delay in the entry of guilty pleas, as indicated above, 26
Table I, p. 196 supra. See generally M.
FERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE (1964).
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but also in large expenditures of court time.
With respect to issue identification and discussion, however,
the impact of the omnibus hearing was more ephemeral.
Almost 20 percent of the cases apparently entered omnibus with
the defendant intending to plead guilty regardless of the hearing's impact, and in an even larger percentage, no issues existed
needing explication in court..2 7 Nevertheless, hearings were held
and identification of substantive issues was, at least nominally,
a part of the exercise conducted. This affected the entire process in two ways. First, in having to devote time to so many
cases in which the process was not relevant, the court wasted
time which could have permitted lengthy consideration of other
cases. A tendency towards speedy rather than reflective hearings was established. Second, since the discussion of issues was
pro forma and unnecessary in many cases, the importance of
issue identification and specification generally suffered. The
50 percent drop-off of issues without decision reflects a tendency to regard lightly the raising of issues.
f. Summary of the 1966-67 Comparison:
No Increase in Efficiency
Since omnibus was intended to make the disposition of
criminal cases more efficient, it is ironic that its impact in each
of the areas discussed above was the reverse. The study examined efficiency largely in terms of judge-time spent in court
per case. The time spent was estimated based upon the types
of appearances recorded in court files. In comparing 1966 and
1967 we found that cases in the second year were handled almost identically to those in the first year, except that the second
year's cases had an additional appearance - the omnibus
28
hearing.
Although this result appears anomalous in comparison to the
objectives of the system, the fact that omnibus increased judge
time per case becomes understandable in light of the discussion
above concerning the objectives and performance of the pre-

27 Seventy-four percent of the case files in our 1967 sample in which an

omnibus hearing was held either contained no checklist form or con-

tained forms on which no issues were indicated. Twelve percent of the

samples listed only issues relating to discovery.

28 Judge Carter noted:

The U.S. Attorneys and defense counsel have been saved much
paperwork on motions, offset by the time used for the additional
appearance in court at the ominbus hearing.
Memorandum from Judge J. Carter. Discussion Material for Seminar of

New Federal Judges 4 (1968).
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existing discretionary process. 2 ' The frequency of early plea dispositions was a part of the generalized thrust of the omnibus
hearing to minimize judge time in court per case. As a result of
this thrust, 65 percent of the 1966 sample cases were handled
with in-court time consumption of ]ess than or equal to the
equivalent of a three-step disposition pattern. For these cases,
omnibus functioned simply as a fourth step - given the already
minimal time input, it could not have achieved any offsetting
time gains in these cases. In the other cases, including but not
limited to cases going to trial, omnibus also served merely as an
additional step. Reductions of continuances, trials, and hearings
were not achieved for reasons discussed above.
Regardless of the method of measurement, this increased
expenditure of court time was substantial. During 1967, the
omnibus hearings took approximately 15 to 25 minutes per case.
Averaging over 1700 cases per year, the additional judge time
element amounts to approximately 425 judge-hours for the cases
filed during that year. Viewed from another perspective, the
bulk of the cases in the district were handled with a three-step
or less process which could not have involved more than 40
minutes in court per case. The addition of omnibus to these
cases increased judge time by a factor of almost 40 percent.
For early disposition cases, the elapsed time to disposition
was increased by the 2 or 3 week interval between arraignment and omnibus hearing and, in many cases, by the additional interval between omnibus and the next scheduled appearance. For later disposition cases, the omnibus effect is not clear,
although there was certainly no compression of negotiation patterns or time lapse gains caused by other factors. Our compari29

For serious (hard) and minor charges, comparison of case weightings
for the two years revealed that, when weightings for the omnibus hearing were deleted, the cases reccrded roughly similar average weightings.
Comparison of marijuana cases was nct used in the main analysis because the crackdown noted earlier made interpretation of marijuana
results impossible.
1967
1966
Hard narcotics:
13.2 (38 cases)
12.1 (39 cases)
non-trial
11.3 (11 cases)
11.4 ( 5 cases)
trial (pre-trial time)
trial (including
105.8
105.0
trial days)
12.8
12.0
all cases
Minor narcotics:
10.6 (54 cases)
8.9 (52 cases)
non-trial
9.2 ( 5 cases)
9.1 ( 9 cases)
trial (pre-trial)
trial (including
102.8
103.1
trial days)
10.2
8.9
all cases
For specifics of the weighting scale employed in this analysis, see R.
NIMMER, supra note 1, at 23.
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son of cases with late disposition patterns revealed large time
lapse increases, but we were unable to estimate what portion
of the increase occurred as a result of omnibus.
With respect to elapsed disposition time for cases involving
defendants held in custody, the discretionary process was ablk
to mold the hearing procedure so as to minimize the negative
effects that the hearing produced elsewhere. In comparing
cases for the two years, elapsed times for disposition in cases
involving defendants who were held in custody show merely
a statistically insignificant increase in the omnibus year.
The explanation for this differential performance is found
in a discretionary adjustment of omnibus in the face of a previously perceived need to process in-custody defendants speedily.
During both years in-custody defendants were handled speedily
(100 days average difference) regardless of whether their cases
were terminated by plea or trial. In the second year, although
in-custody cases experienced the early plea shift discussed
above, they went through a greater number of steps prior to
disposition in the second year with comparatively little additional time lapse.
The explanation lies in a reduction of the time lapse intervals for each early step. In-custody cases were arraigned with
more speed than non-custody cases, a phenomenon apparently
occurring both years. As Judge Carter said:
Our rule is that if the defendant is in jail, he comes up for arraignment on the Monday succeeding the Wednesday when the
indictment is returned. If the defendant is cn bail, he comes up
a week from the Monday succeeding the Wednesday on which
30
the indictment is returned.

More importantly, the interval between arraignment and the
omnibus hearing was shortened by the court. This was accomplished before the omnibus appearance and is reflected in the
scheduling made at arraignment. Measured in terms of mean
values, the interval for in-custody cases was 14 days while the
interval for non-custody cases was 24 days (in-custody: 14 days
for non-trials, 15 days for trials; non-custody: 24 days for no
trial, 25 days for trials).
3.

Omnibus 1970:

Complete System Absorption

The interval between appearances under the omnibus system was modified immediately to conform to a desire to handle
in-custody cases expeditiously. Over a longer period of time,
the omnibus hearing itself was modified by the pressures which
3 Letter from Judge J. Carter to several district court judges.
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had previously forced the system toward emphasis upon economical use of in-court time. The omnibus hearing process
observed by our staff in 1970 resembled neither the theoretical
omnibus hearing format, nor the actual format followed during
1967. This modification occurred without formal changes of
policy or purpose, and provides a demonstration of the ability
of the system to transform new procedures to fit more comfortably into the preexisting system rationale. The tendency
of the system to transform new additions is an often-overlooked,
but vital consideration in the drafting of judicial reform ideas.
In 1967 the omnibus hearing consumed between 10 and 25
minutes of judge time and called for individualized attention
to each case. By 1970 this format had been transformed into a
mass production model in which hearings lasted no more than 5
minutes, and most were completed within 1 minute, a transformation which reduced the inconsistency between the scheduling of a hearing and the emphasis of the system upon minimizing in-court time. A single prosecutor appeared for all omnibus hearings on a given day, and one or two members of the
staff of the Federal Defender handled the omnibus hearing caseload for their office. The judicial officer, no longer a judge, but
rather the magistrate, devotes one full day each week entirely
to the disposition of omnibus hearing matters. Between 60 and
31
80 omnibus hearings are handled in a single day.
Under this "mass production model" the omnibus hearing
was transformed from an appearance in which the judicial
officer discusses and suggests the proper progression of the case
into an appearance in which all of the substantive discussion
is disposed of by stipulation. At each "hearing," the defense
attorney files a stipulated motion form on which he has indicated issues to be raised during the case. The form is signed by
the prosecutor and the defense attorney. During the hearing,
the judicial officer inquires into the need for schedules for trial,
disposition, or hearing, and ascertains whether the informal discovery has been completed prior to the hearing. He makes no
effort to discuss the substance of the case in any respect.
Although the magistrate emphasizes establishing appropriate
case schedules and the attorneys pay lip service to the idea that
the stipulated form is regarded as binding, neither the scheduling nor the indication of issues is enforced following the omni31

This process minimizes time spent by the court, the U.S. Attorney, and
Federal Defender. However, the private defense bar is not so fortunate.
Although each hearing takes little time, the period spent waiting for the

one-minute hearing may amount to as much as 2 hours.
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bus hearing. The schedules made at omnibus are virtually
ignored. Of a sample of narcotics cases filed in 1970, only about
40 percent conformed to the schedule indicated at the omnibus hearing. This percentage decreases to around 15 percent if
we exclude those cases indicated for a disposition hearingas previously, indications for "disposition" continue to be a firm
statement of intention to plead guilty.
One innovation has occurred in scheduling technique which
modifies the extent to which schedules for trial dates are essentially meaningless. This is an intermediate scheduling device
iabeled "trial call" which calls for an appearance by counsel on
the specified date for the purpose of indicating whether a trial
date should be set. Essentially, the trial call is used in cases in
which, at the time of the omnibus hearing the eventual likelihood of a guilty plea is fairly clear to the parties, but neither
side is willing to be fully committed to the extent of requiring
a disposition hearing schedule.
Despite the use of this intermediate scheduling device, the
district experiences a major problem with respect to "trial dropouts," i.e., trial set cases which involved either a request, a continuance, or a plea of guilty on the day of trial. Substantial
resources are mounted in preparing for trials which are not
held, and the judicial personnel in the district regard failure
to comply with trial schedulings as an important problem. The
magistrate, recognizing this dropout pattern, schedules as many
as eight trials per judge on a given day, hoping to leave the
judge with at least one or two cases for trial after the dropouts
have occurred.
The omnibus hearing, quite obviously, was intended to meet
this kind of problem, but in discussing possible solutions, the
personnel in the district no longer refer to the hearing but, instead, consider additional scheduling tools. When we conducted
our research, a frequently mentioned alternative was to establish a date, one week prior to the trial day, at which the
attorneys would be required to indicate their readiness to proceed to trial. Once readiness has been indicated, the trial date
would be enforced by denying any continuance request and
taking steps to deny the fruits of the later plea bargaining to
32
the defendant who was delayed for so long.
32

An earlier attempt to supplement omnibus is described in the following

court order:
General Order 82; April, 1969: By reason of the extreme crucial
condition of our trial calendar, it is ordered that from date hereof,
after all parties . . . have announced that they are ready for
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The general theme expressed was that omnibus occurred
too early to be effective in establishing firm trial dates. In explaining why late pleas are so frequent, several judicial officers emphasized the desire of the defendant to defer inevitable
conviction as long as possible, but they also mentioned that the
U.S. Attorney, in the interests of fairness, continue.s to negotiate
with most defendants until the last moment. The assistant U.S.
Attorneys that were interviewed emphasized the continued bargaining aspect of the above explanation. Several suggested that
continued bargaining violated an office policy that negotiation
cease after the omnibus hearing -- a policy which had never
been fully enforced.
The role of the omnibus hearing in establishing a firm
list of issues has become a passive one-the court merely
accepts a stipulated checklist motion form submitted by the
attorneys. Once this form is accepted, however, it is virtually
never enforced. One attorney indicated that his only purpose in
listing issues on the hearing form and requesting a hearing date
was to obtain a specific date for a hearing. The matter of which
issues might be raised or discussed at that hearing could be
deferred with relative impunity until the time at which notice
entries are filed for the hearing date. The indication is that,
for those cases in which issues might be raised and litigated,
omnibus occurs too early to enable the attorneys to make a firm
commitment, and in the other cases it is meaningless. In response to this, the checklist form has become essentially an unimportant ritual which has little bearing upon deciding which
issues will eventually be determined.
Omnibus plays a nominal role in enforcing disclosure. At
each hearing the magistrate inquires whether discovery has
been accomplished, and if it has not, he delays the hearing until
the files have been reviewed by the defense attorney. However,
an interesting shift in the attitude of the judicial officer towards
this enforcement role has occurred. In those cases in which disclosure has not occurred by the time of the omnibus hearing,
the initial leaning of the magistrate is to consider the failure to
achieve the disclosure as resulting primarily from the laxity
of the defense attorney. The practice of making files available

trial, and the case is sent out for trial, no plea of guilty to a
lesser charge or to less than all of the charges contained in the
the complaint shall be accepted.
This order was never enforced; it became, almost immediately
upon its issue, a dead letter.
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to the defense has become so routine that reluctance on the part
of the prosecutor has become virtually nonexistent.
Under the 1970 procedure, cases are handled by the complaint section of the U.S. Attorney's Office until they are set
for trial. Thus, the full period prior to the omnibus hearing is
handled by the small group of assistant U.S. Attorneys in this
section, and their attitudes toward discovery determine the extent to which omnibus hearing has to play an enforcement role.
The attorneys in the complaint section regard the disclosure
practice as a routine matter which causes no noticeable disruption in the processing and negotiation of cases. The comments of the magistrate support this and he notes that there is
seldom any difficulty in making files available to the defense.
Once the case is set for trial, however, it is transferred to
the trial section of the U.S. Attorney's Office. In this portion of
the office, the attitudes toward discovery are mixed and less
favorable. Whereas the bulk of the caseload at the complaint
office consists of many routine cases which will easily be turned
into bargain pleas, the cases which reach trial section are more
prone to pursue an adversary disposition of the prosecution.
This may influence the attitudes of the assistants at this level.
Also, the personnel in the trial section experience a substantial
turnover, with new attorneys entering frequently. These new
attorneys have not had the time to deal with the discovery practices for any lengthy period, and their attitudes reflect an initial unwillingness to permit extensive disclosure. In fact, although some of the attorneys at the trial section will freely disclose evidence obtained in their investigations, many simply
refuse to make disclosures. The court does not compel disclosure where the prosecutor refuses to comply--except
through the vehicle of the omnibus hearing. Therefore, with
respect to any late-developing evidence, the extent to which the
defense receives disclosures is controlled by the attitude of the
prosecutor in the trial section who happens to be handling
the case.
Interestingly, despite the comparatively broad disclosure,
the defense attorneys are not fully satisfied with the process.
Although they acknowledge that, at early stages, the files are
routinely made available, they have come to regard disclosure
as a minimal requirement, and are pushing to make access to
files more administratively convenient. They emphasize that
obtaining and recording the information in the prosecutor's files
is a burdensome task, since important items, such as FBI re-
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ports, cannot be photostated but must be read and dictated to
33
be retyped.
CONCLUSION

The experience of the omnibus hearing in San Diego illustrates a variety of manners in which discretionary administrative practices affect the course of actual change. Disclosure of
prosecution files occurred without substantial controversy, and
became a routine part of the practice in the system largely because of the ability of the discretionary process to balance benefits and detriments. Earlier pleas, better scheduling, and conservation of judicial time did not occur in San Diego despite
a general enthusiam for achieving these results, largely because
the preexisting process had already achieved a balance which
went far toward maximizing performance, especially with respect to early pleas and the saving of judge time. Guilty pleas
were actually delayed in a large number of cases as a result of
a shift in timing of the bargaining process so as to permit the
use of the omnibus hearing for early disposition matters.
The effects produced by omnibus might appear inexplicable
if one were to assume the traditional model of the adversary
process as describing the manner in which the system actually
performs. However, measured against an understanding of the
discretionary procedures in the jurisdiction, the results are
clearly predictable. The lesson is apparent in preparing to seek
reform of the process in any jurisdiction: it is essential to examine the results and the rationale of the preexisting system, and
to understand how the proposed procedure will fit into the discretionary enforcement patterns.
For the bulk of the caseload, the criminal justice system in
San Diego was neither slow in disposing of cases nor inefficient
33

Several months after the data for this report had been gathered and the
analysis completed, the author had the oppcrtunity to speak with the
new director of the defender program in San Diego. During this conversation, the current director asserted that the omnibus hearing had
been revitalized. According to this report, the hearing currently serves
an important function in ensuring disclosure of prosecution files and
in achieving the other objectives of the original concept.
We have had no opportunity to examine the extent to which omnibus has re-emerged as an active part of the San Diego federal criminal
process. However, assuming that the report is accurate, it supports
the conclusion that the presence of a forceful and interested individual
or individuals can temporarily force the hearing to go against the grain
of the system emphasis on efficiency. As we have seen, during 1967,
the omnibus process suffered not from lack of effort, but from lack
of accomplishment. The stripped-down, mass production version described in this section was the product of growing disinterest and caseload pressure during the intervening years. Unless, unlike the 1967 version, the 1971 cmnibus performs a needed, affirmative function in
processing the cases, a reversion to a mass production model is probable as the current level of interest and pressure subsides.
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in terms of in-court time. There are preliminary indications
that the speedy disposition for most cases is not a phenomenon
limited simply to the San Diego district court. Recent studies
by the Federal Judicial Center indicate that 75 percent of all
criminal cases in the federal system are terminated within 180
days of filing. This interval includes the time during which the
defendant may have been a fugitive from justice and the time
necessary to develop a probation report for the sentencing of
already convicted offenders. If these aspects of the time measurement were deleted, the percentage would increase substantially.3 4 Likewise, a study of the Chicago courts with respect
to the processing of felony cases found that 50 percent of these
cases were disposed of within 90 days of filing.3 5 Referring to
our data with the qualification that the exact profile of the timing of disposition may not be generally applicable, the following chart for serious narcotics cases depicts the extent to which
most cases are disposed of very early:
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Speedy disposition is fully consistent with the further observation that in-court time is minimized by the discretionary
adjustment process. Both results relate to the fact that the discretionary system has, in most jurisdictions, been forced to
adjust to a situation in which there has been a chronic im-4 Interview with William Eldridge, Research Director, Federal Judicial
Center, Chicago, Illinois, June 22, 1971.
3.5 Banfield & Anderson, Continuances in the Cook County Criminal Courts,
35 U. CHI. L. REV. 259 (1968).
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balance of resources and caseloads. It has long been generally
known that the negotiation process minimizes the frequency
with which trial dispositions are followed. However, the San
Diego data suggest that even within the non-trial category, the
system goes far toward minimizing the time spent in court per
case. Supportive data suggesting the general applicability of this
observation come from the Chicago studyA" This study indicated
that 50 percent of the felony cases were handled with five or
less court appearances.
If these observations are generally accurate, attempts at
reforming the judicial process must take into account a system
in which there has been a substantial pre-adjustment of speed
and court-time factors. The long-delayed, time consuming case
is the exception to an efficient adjustment procedure, and
should be treated as such. Delay in the criminal courts may be
a problem, but the problem must be defined as being applicable to only a minority of the caseload. Clearly, a selective
reform technique is essential to avoid offsetting time losses
or the dilution of effort involved in attempting to speed
and make more efficient the disposition of cases which are handled very quickly already. Additionally, since the systems may
have long adopted a technique of minimizing in-court time,
it is entirely inconsistent to seek substantial reform by creating
a time-consuming and generally mandatory in-court appearance.
It is predictable, and was observed in San Diego, that such timeconsuming appearances will, over a long period of time, be
modified and integrated into the existing rationale of the system, just as the adversary model generally has been adjusted
to meet the demands of efficiency.
It may be accurate to observe that, assuming once again
that the speedy and efficient disposition is generally widespread,
the problem in reforming the court processing system is not to
achieve general patterns of greater speed or efficiency. There
may be some need in the minority of the cases to speed the disposition patterns. But the primary goal may be the exact reverse - there may be a need to delay and to increase the formal
judicial involvement in the disposition of the bulk of the routine
caseload handled within the system. In a sense this was implicit
in a statement made by the chief U.S. Attorney in San Diego
who, as previously noted, remarked that a primary effect of
omnibus and especially of the increased discovery was to inject
an element of greater fairness into the bulk of the caseload.
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